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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION-FEDERAL TAX REGISTRATION
STATUTES
Defendant Marchetti was convicted in the United States District Court
for violation of the federal wagering tax statutes, in that Marchetti con-
spired with others to evade the annual occupation tax imposed on gamblers,'
wilfully failed to pay the special occupational tax, and wilfully failed to
register 2 before engaging in the business of accepting wagers. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court,3 based on the
authority of United States v. Kahriger4 and Lewis v. United States.5 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari6 and reversed the
decision of the lower court, expressly overruling Kahriger and Lewis and
holding for the first time that the privilege against self-incrimination7 is a
valid defense for a gambler accused of failure to register in compliance with
the requirements of the federal wagering tax statutes. Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
In the companion case, defendant Grosso was convicted in the United
States District Court for wilful failure to pay the excise tax imposed on
wagering,8 wilful failure to pay the special occupational tax imposed on
gambling,9 and conspiracy to defraud the United States by evading pay-
ment of both taxes. Although this decision was affirmed,10 the United States
Supreme Court reversed," holding that the privilege is a valid defense to
a charge of failure to register and pay excise tax in compliance with the
federal wagering tax statute. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
The companion cases of Marchetti and Grosso deal with separate sections
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4411.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4412.
a352 F.2d 848 (1965).
4 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
5348 U.S. 419 (1955).
6385 U.S. 1000 (1967). The sole issue on appeal was whether the statutory obliga-
tions to register and pay the occupational tax violated defendant's fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4401.
9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4411.
10358 F.2d 154 (1966).
11 The sole issue on appeal was whether payment of the excise tax would have required
defendant to incriminate himself.
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of the federal wagering tax statutes, and by applying the privilege in each
instance, the Supreme Court has invalidated the doctrines of Kahriger and
Lewis in their application to any of the essential provisions of the federal
wagering tax statutes.' 2 This case note will analyze the treatment of the
fifth amendment privilege in the Marchetti and Grosso cases as a logical
extension of recent case law, and at the same time, as a complete reversal
of the long-standing precedents begun by the Ka/riger case.13
The federal wagering tax is a comprehensive enactment of statutory regu-
lations imposing registration and taxation requirements on certain forms of
gambling.' 4 The registration provision provides that everyone in the business
of accepting wagers, either for himself or for others, shall register with the
official in charge of the local Internal Revenue district.' 5 This registration
is an essential prerequisite to paying the occupational tax and the excise
tax16 Failure to comply with the above statutes, and then proceeding to
engage in the gambling activities controlled by these statutes,17 renders the
offender liable to prosecution for a federal offense.' 8 Yet if the same indi-
vidual were to comply with all the necessary provisions of the statute perti-
nent to his gambling activities,19 his name would be placed on a list of
gambling registrants at the office of the district director of Internal Revenue,
and subsequently made available to state prosecuting authorities. 20 In
view of the comprehensive system of state penal statutes punishing various
gambling activities, 21 the federally registered gambler provides evidence
12 §§ 4411, 4412 and 4401 are the main provisions of the federal wagering tax statutes,
and the Court, through Marchetti and Grosso, extended the coverage of the fifth amend-
ment to apply to all three sections.
18 There has been no case in point which has been at variance with Kahriger, yet the
development of the scope of the privilege in other areas since 1952 has necessitated
further consideration of the registration and taxation issue.
14 § 4401 of Title 26 imposes upon those in the business of accepting wagers an excise
tax of 10% on the gross amount of all wagers they accept, including the value of chances
purchased in lotteries conducted for profit. Parimutuel wagering enterprises, coin-operated
devices, and state-conducted sweepstakes are expressly excluded from taxation. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4402 (1954). Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697, 699 (1968).
15 INT. Rny. CODE OF 1954, § 4412.
16 The Internal Revenue Service has refused to accept the fifty dollar occupational
tax unless it is accompanied by the completed registration form. See United States v.
Whiting, 311 F.2d 191 (1962); United States v. Mungiole, 233 F.2d 204 (1956).
17 Supra note 14.
18 INT. REV. CODE OP 1954, § 7203.
1 9 NT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4401, 4411, 4412 and 6806.
20 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 6107.
21 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 28 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 18, §§ 4601-07
(1963); see Marchetti v. United States, supra note 14, at 701, n.5.
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sufficient to convict himself in some states,22 while in other states, he supplies
evidence which sets in motion the state prosecuting machinery23
The use of the privilege against self-incriminaton as a defense to a charge
of violation of the wagering tax statutes was first considered by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Kahriger.24 In that case, the defendant was in the
business of accepting wagers and he was charged with wilful failure to regis-
ter for, and pay, the gambler's occupational tax.2 5 Defendant claimed that
the registration provision violated his privilege against self-incrimination,
and thus presented the court with the identical issue that the Marchetti
court was to face sixteen years later.
Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, held that the privilege was not
a valid defense to the charge. He stated that:
under the registration provisions of the wagering tax, appellee is not compelled to
confess to acts already committed, he is merely informed by the statute that in
order to engage in the business of accepting wagers in the future he must fulfill
certain conditions. 26
The Court concluded that the registration requirement only admitted to
prospective acts, which are not within the protections of the fifth amend-
ment. Prior to Marchetti, courts presented with the identical issue concerning
the privilege in its relation to gambler's registration uniformly held that the
privilege is inapplicable, relying heavily on the prospective acts doctrine laid
down in Kahriger. Since Marchetti completely reversed this Kahriger prece-
dent, it is necessary to trace the development of the scope of the fifth amend-
ment privilege, and analyze what role this development has played in leading
to the overruling of Kahriger.
Originally, the constitutional protection against self-incrimination was
designed to protect a person from being compelled to give oral testimony
against himself in a criminal proceeding in which he was a defendant. 27
However, case law concerning the application of the privilege has led to a
judicial development of the privilege which has broadened its scope.28 The
22Kansas City v. Lee, 414 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. 1967); Acklen v. Tennessee, 196 Tenn.
314, 267 S.W.2d 101 (1954); Deitch v. Chattanooga, 195 Tenn. 245, 259 S.W.2d 776
(1953).
2 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); State v. Curry, 92 Ohio App. 1, 109
N.E.2d 298 (1952).
24 Supra note 4.
25ITNT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 3290, 3291 and 3285. These sections, under which
Kahriger was convicted, correspond to §§ 4411, 4412 and 4401 of the INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, under which Marchetti was indicted.
26 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 32 (1953).
27 15 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 253, 255 (1966).
28 See 15 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 595 (1966); 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561 (1965); 65 COLVM.
L. REv. 681 (1965); 29 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1930).
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privilege has been extended to apply to civil cases as well as to criminal
cases. 29 The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that "the privilege
extends beyond defendants in criminal proceedings to protect any witness in
any type of proceeding which can legally demand testimony, when such
testimony might ultimately be used against the person in a criminal pro-
ceeding." 30 In Quinn v. United States,81 the privilege was held to protect a
person appearing before a legislative committee. In United States v. Chandler,
the Court stated that:
to sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the ques-
tion, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because in-
jurious disclosure could result.3 2
Further expanding the scope of the privilege, the Supreme Court in Mal-
loy v. Hogan stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment secures against Fed-
eral infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty
. . . for such silence." 3 On the same day, in Murphy v. United States, the
Court held that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law
and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal
law."3 4 Consequently, in any future federal prosecution for violation of the
wagering tax statutes, the court had to consider the gambler's invocation of
the defense of the privilege against self-incrimination in view of the threat
of prosecution from the widespread state criminal statutes . 3  The privilege
has been ruled applicable not only to answers which would in themselves be
sufficient to criminally prosecute the person answering, but also to those
answers which would supply a link in the chain of evidence needed to suc-
cessfully prosecute the person answering." In the words of Professor Wig-
29 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
3OWendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege:
New Development and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327, 329 (1966).
81 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
82United States v. Chandler, 380 F.2d 993, 997 (1967).
3 3 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
84 Murphy v. United States, 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964).
85 The Kahriger decision was a federal case decided before Murphy, and thus the only
threat of prosecution was from federal statutes punishing gambling. Today, due to the
Murphy decision, there is a definite threat of prosecution from the states, and the
fifth amendment must now encompass these state threats and protect the defendant
from them.
36 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Brunner v. United States, 343 U.S.
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more, "The privilege thus protects facts which may by disclosure lead ulti-
mately to the extra-judicial detection of the criminal fact and its subsequent
infra-judicial proof by other testimony."37
In accord with this expanding interpretation, and of particular significance
in the Marchetti decision, is the case of Albertson v. Subversive 'Activities
Control Board.38 Petitioners there, members of the Communist Party, were
required by federal statute to register as members of the Communist Party, 9
and petitioners claimed that this compulsory registration violated their privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court decided
for petitioners, basing its decision on two factual suppositions. First, the
filing of form IS-52A admitting to party membership "may be used to prose-
cute the registrants under the membership clause of the Smith Act, . . .or
under the Subversive Activities Control Act . . .4 and thus there is suffi-
cient threat of present prosecution to warrant the use by petitioners of the
privilege against self-incrimination. 4 1 Secondly, "the information called for
by form IS-52 ...42 might be used as evidence in or at least supply investi-
gatory leads to a criminal prosecution.1 43
In deciding that petitioners had a valid defense, the Court also distin-
guished the type of registration in Albertson from the income tax registration
in United States v. Sullivan.4 4
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral on their face and
directed at the public at large, but here they are directed at a highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities. Petitioners' claims are not asserted
in an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an inquiry
in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form's
questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial
element of a crime.45
918 (1952); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340
U.S. 332 (1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1951).
87 8 W GmoRE, EvmaEcE § 2261 (3d ed. 1940).
88 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
89 Subversive Activities Control Act, Tit. I, Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat.
987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq.
4018 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964); 50 U.S.C. § 783(a) (1964).
41 The threat of prosecution under the Smith Act is analogous to the threat of state
prosecution to the defendant in Marchetti.
42 Form IS-52 requires the registrant to list his name, aliases, date of birth, residence,
business address, and a list of offices held in the organization. This information is similar
to that demanded of the gambler: his name, place of residence, address of gambling
activity, and the names of persons from whom he receives wagers.
43 Supra note 4, at 78.
44274 US. 259 (1927).
4 5 Supra note 38, at 79.
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Thus the privilege is a good defense when raised in a fact situation similar
to Albertson, and this also represents a further expansion of the scope of
the privilege: it is a valid defense in the area of federally required registra-
tion.
The Supreme Court has treated the privilege against self-incrimination as
an organic concept, not to be confined to its original interpretations, and
thus not susceptible to a rigid interpretation based solely on precedent. The
privilege is to be liberally construed so as to afford adequate protection
against the type of harm that it was intended to limit, and not confined to
the particular harms that it had limited in the past.46
Subsequent to the Albertson case, in United States v. Millo,47 the Court
held that the wagering tax statutes do not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination even in view of Albertson, since Albertson had not expressly
overruled Lewis v. United States,48 or United States v. Kahriger.4 9 Never-
theless, Albertson did foreshadow a future reversal of the Kahriger precedent.
The Court in Marchetti was cognizant of the implications of Albertson
and therefore granted certiorari for that sole issue: "Should not this court,
especially in view of its recent decision in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, . . . overrule United States v. Kahriger . . . and Lewis v.
United States . . . ?,,50
The defendant in the Marchetti case answered the wagering tax indict-
ment by invoking the plea that such indictment violated his privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court rejected the Kahriger Court's view "that the
registration and occupational tax requirements are entirely prospective in
their application, and that the constitutional privilege, since it offers pro-
tection only as to past and present acts, is accordingly unavailable."'" As in
the Albertson case, the Court felt that there was sufficient threat of prosecu-
tion to warrant defendant's use of the privilege, regardless of the chrono-
logical order of the events leading up to its use. There are federal 52 as well
as state53 laws prohibiting gambling, and since the answers demanded of
defendant are in this "area permeated with criminal statutes,' 5 4 there is a
"real and not merely trifling or imaginary hazard of incrimination." 55
468 WiGmORE, EViDENCa § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
47 354 F.2d 224 (1965).
48 Supra note S.
49 Supra note 4.
50 Supra note 6.
5' Marchetti v. United States, supra note 14, at 704.
52 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1082, 1083, 1084, 1302 and 1953 (1964); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1171-77
(1958).
5 3 Supra note 21.
54 Supra note 38, at 79.
55 Marchetti v. United States, supra note 14, at 705.
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The Court also felt that apart from the existence of the danger of a
present incrimination in the face of federal and state laws, there exists the
danger that registration in accordance with the wagering tax statutes will
supply "a link in the 'chain of evidence' culminating in conviction"56 since
"state prosecutors are apprised of the registrants' places of illegal activity
and also of the names and addresses of everyone who collects wagers for
him."'57 Hence registration, in effect, coerces confession of present criminal
activity, is evidence of conspiracy to carry on this activity, and elicits in-
formation which may supply a link in the chain of evidence necessary for
conviction, posing therefore a real, not imaginary, threat of prosecution.
The Court also distinguished this case from United States v. Sullivan.58
In Sullivan, defendant taxpayer was convicted of wilful failure to file an
income tax return, and defendant claimed the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The Sullivan Court rejected defendant's claim since the income tax
return was directed at the public at large and "most of the return's questions
would not have compelled the taxpayer to make incriminating disclosures." 59
Therefore, defendant could not refuse to submit any registration at all
merely because some of the questions might incidentally demand incrimina-
tory disclosures. In contradistinction, the questions in Marchetti were "di-
rected at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activity." 60
In Shapiro v. United States,"1 the Supreme Court held that where records
are required to be kept by an individual, this person cannot refuse to pro-
duce these records based on his constitutionally guaranteed privilege against
self-incrimination, provided the facts are that "he is obliged to keep and
preserve records 'of a kind customarily kept,' "62 the information is of a
public character, and it is required in an "essentially non-criminal and regu-
latory area of inquiry. '63 These prerequisite elements not being present, the
Marchetti Court rejected the attempted extension of the Shapiro doctrine.
While not altering the wording of the fifth amendment, the Supreme
Court has further expanded the umbrella of its protection to encompass the
present system of federal registration for gambling activities. At the same
time, the Court has left the door wide open for Congress to implement new
56 Comment, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Gambling Tax, 5 DuRE B.J. 86,
89 (1956).
57 Id. at- 91.
58 Supra note 44.
59 Supra note 55, at 703.
60 Supra note 38, at 79.
61335 U.S. 1 (1948).
62 Supra note 55, at 707.
es Supra note 38, at 79.
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means of enforcing taxation of gambling. In summing up the opinion of
the Court, Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
We emphasize that we do not hold that these wagering tax provisions are as such
constitutionally impermissable; we hold only that those who properly assert the
constitutional privilege as to these provisions may not be criminally punished for
failure to comply with their requirements. If, in different circumstances, a tax-
payer is not confronted by substantial hazards of self-incrimination, or if he is
otherwise outside of the privilege's protections, nothing we decide today would
shield him from the various penalties prescribed by the wagering tax statutes.64
The Court has limited this decision to a very narrow fact situation, and also
has invited Congress to enact immunity statutes, thereby placing the tax-
payer "outside the privilege's protections. "65
Since 1857 Congress has adopted many compulsory immunity statutes
which, by removing the possibility of criminal prosecution for matters re-
vealed in compelled testimony, thereby also makes unnecessary and impos-
sible resort by a defendant to the fifth amendment privilege.66 There are
many federal statutes today with immunity provisions included within the
statute itself.67 Congress has precedent to effectively enforce these gambling
provisions, for "immunity law may replace the privilege provided that pro-
tections under immunity law are co-extensive with the protections afforded
by the privilege against self-incrimination." 68
The Court in Marchetti has liberally cast the protections of the fifth
amendment into a new dimension, heretofore untouched by a successful
defense of the privilege; and in the next breath, the Court has devoted the
entire conclusion of its opinion to urging Congress to enact an immunity
statute, thereby defeating the use of the privilege in this area. The Court
has let the citizenry know that the privilege against self-incrimination is
indeed a very basic and broad concept in the Constitution, but the Court also
recognizes that there are many necessary functions of Congress which must
and can be enforced by law, if accompanied by statutory safeguards of the
constitutional rights of the individual. But until Congress decides to pursue
this course of action, gambling activities in the United States will flourish
by virtue of the protection granted to them in Marchetti.
This protection also extends beyond gambling into other areas of manda-
tory registration. In Haynes v. United States,69 defendant was convicted of
64 Supra note 14, at 709.
65 Supra note 14, at 709.
66 Shapiro v. United States, supra note 61, at 6.
67 Shapiro v. United States, supra note 61, at 6, n.4.
88 Counsel v. Hitchcock, 142 US. 547, 586 (1892).
69 88 S. Ct. 722 (1968).
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knowingly possessing a firearm which had not been registered. 70 In view of
Marchetti and Grosso, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
court holding "that a proper claim of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination provides a full defense to prosecutions either for failure
to register a firearm ... or for possession of an unregistered firearm .... ,,7
Nevertheless, one court has rejected an attempt to extend the privilege as a
defense in the area of marijuana registration. In United States v. Reyes, 72 de-
fendant was convicted of possessing illegally imported marijuana. Marijuana
is imported illegally if the importer does not register and pay the tax levied
on its importation.73 The defendant claimed that he could not be prosecuted
for possession of illegally imported marijuana because the statute makes
registration an essential prerequisite to importation. Basing his defense on
the Marchetti case, he claimed that this registration violates the importer's
privilege against self-incrimination, and thus the statute is unconstitutional
and cannot be used to prosecute him. Significantly, the court denied this
contention, emphasizing that the defendant here is not being forced to
register, while in Marchetti and Grosso, failure to register was an essential
element of the crimes.
The Court in Reyes refused to overextend the Marchetti decision, but did
leave the door open for the importer of the marijuana, who must register
under the statute, to use the privilege as a defense.
To predict exactly where the Supreme Court will allow the reasoning of
the Marchetti decision to prevail is an impossible task, but it is worthy of
note that cases in areas other than gambling are arising, and the Court must
struggle with them in view of the Marchetti decision. With much greater
facility, Congress can remove this burden from the courts by enacting im-
munity statutes in the fields of taxation and registration which involve an
infringement upon a taxpayer's constitutional rights-a course of action
which the Supreme Court, itself, recognized as necessary to avoid the con-
fusion which would otherwise inevitably arise.
Joseph Ross
70 26 U.S.C. §§ 5891, 5841 (1964).
71 Supra note 69, at 732.
72 280 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
7321 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964).
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